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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

-vs-

t

RAYMOND JEFFREY JOHNSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

:

Case No. 20562

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment
issued by the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, with aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202,
Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 203 (1)(4), and Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), and with aggravated assault, a third degree felony
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Title 76,
Chapter 3, Section 203 (3)(4), and Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) and with
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theft a second degree felony, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 2, Section 202, Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 203
(2) (4) and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412 and Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

Following a jury trial which commenced on January

16, 1985, appellant was sentenced to a term in the Utah
State Prison of not less than five (5) but which may be for
his life, on the aggravated robbery, not more than five (5)
years in the Utah state prison on the aggravated assault and
not less than one (1) or more than fifteen (15) years on the
theft conviction.

In addition the defendant was given an

additional one (1) year in the Utah State Prison to run
consecutively with the previous terms as an enhancement for
the use of a firearm.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and the
order of the court requiring a new trial on the matter.

In

addition, appellant seeks suppression of certain evidence
which was introduced at trial, and the order of the court
prohibiting its introduction at any subsequent trial.

In

addition, appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for
aggravated assault and theft and this courts order
dismissing the same.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

That the district court erred in not suppressing

the evidence seized in California because there was no
probable cause to enter and search.

The search went beyond

constitutional limits of an inventory in opening the hood
and the locket trunk of the automobile and certain
containers found in the trunk.
2.

That there was insufficient evidence to convict

appellant of the aggravated assault because there was no
evidence appellant displayed a weapon, directly committing
the offense or aided by requesting or commanding such
assault to be committed.
3.

That the court erred in instructing the jury

regarding certain inferences to be drawn from the fact that
defendant was found in possession of recently stolen
property as a violation of due process of law.
4.

That the court erred in not dismissing the

charge of theft as a lesser included offense of robbery
under the facts of this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 18th day of August, 1984, a man identified as
Paul Anthony Branch entered Oakwood Jewelry, located at 2342
East 70th South in Salt Lake County.

He confronted JoAnn
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Knapus, a sales person at the business, forcing her into a
back room. (T. Vol. 4 Pg. 9-13)

A second person entered the

establishment and was behind a sales counter when Stella
Kyarsguard, a sales person connected with another business
located at the approximate location of Oakwood Jewelry,
entered the business establishment. (T. Vol. 7 Pg. 30-37)
Mrs. Kyarsguard identified this other person, on alternate
occasions, either as Paul Anthony Branch or Allan David
Johnson.

She was confronted by this second man who

displayed a firearm forcing her into the same back room
where Mrs. Knapus was located.
When the two ladies were released from the back room
they observed that all of the jewelry, previously located in
various display cabinets and cases had been taken. (T. Vol.
4 Pg. 19)
Marsha Wright and her daughter Misty were sitting in
their automobile in the parking lot outside of Oakwood
Jewelry when they observed two men with a large garbage bag
hurrying around the corner and entering a yellowish-tannish
automobile they later identified had 4 doors and was a
Pontiac.

The two ladies described the men as wearing army

type fatigues with caps and full beards.

The automobile

they entered had two passengers, a man driving and a woman
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with long black hair in the front passenger seat.
witnesses identified appellant at trial.

All these

They were unable

to make an identification when shown appellant's picture by
police on prior occasions.

(T. Vol. 6 Pg. 110-122; 129;

160-177)
On August 24, 1984, at the Pink Motel in Los Angeles
California, two officers, with the Los Angeles Police
Department assigned to a burglary detail, were on routine
patrol investigating burglary suspects.
3-11; Vol 4 Pg. 89-96)

(T. Vol. 2 Pg.

They observed, in the parking lot of

the Pink Motel, appellant, Raymond Jeffrey Johnson, behind
the wheel of a tannish Chevrolet operating hydraulic lifts.
Having positioned themselves in the parking lot of the
motel, they observed, through the open door of apartment 10,
two people standing and apparently administering drugs
intravenously.

The officers repositioned themselves and

observed a person later identified as Gina Salazar enter the
automobile which appellant Johnson had started.

The

automobile began to exit the parking lot when the officers
observed two other people, later identified as Allan David
Johnson and Teresa Alverez, approaching the automoble.

The

officers stopped the suspects, observing marijuana inside
the automobile and track marks on the inside of the suspects
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arms.

The officers placed the suspects under arrest for

using controlled substances and commenced a search of both
the automobile and apartment 10 of the motel.

(T. Vol. 2

Pg. 12-16; Vol. 4 Pg. 103-111)
The officers, in their search, seized items of drug
paraphernalia in the motel room and a hand held .38 caliber
revolver, in addition to various items of jewelry.

They

also seized jewelry located in purses and upon the persons
of various suspects.
The officers then determined to do an inventory
search of the automobile following their declared purpose of
impounding the same, pursuant to the arrest of the suspects
for using controlled substances.

During the course of the

search an officer raised the hood of the Chevrolet and
observed a towel secured with cords near the engine.
officer seized the bundle.
various items of jewelry.

The

Inside the bundle were found
The officers also opened the

trunk of the automobile and observed a small five (5) inch
by two (2) inch box with the name Oakwood Jewelry.

The

officers seized the box, opened the same, and found small
bindles containing precious gems inside.
16-18;

(T. Vol. 2 Pg.

Vol. 4 Pg. 109-112)
The authorities in Salt Lake City were contacted,
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because of the address on the Oakwood Jewelry box and it was
later determined by the Los Angeles police that the jewelry
they had seized had been stolen. Appellant was extradited
to Utah and charged with the aggravated robbery of JoAnn
Knapus, the aggravated assault of Stella Kyarsguard and the
theft from Oakwood Jewelry.
A Motion to Suppress evidence seized from the
automibile, the motel and person of appellant was filed,
argued and denied and said evidence was subsequently
introduced at trial.

(Record Pg. 53; T. Vol. 1 and Vol. 2)

At trial, neither Mrs. Knapus nor Mrs. Kyarsguard
identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
offense.

However, other witnesses, including Marsha and

Misty Wright, located outside the business testified that
they had observed appellant walking about the business.
Although each of these witnesses identified appellant
Johnson, they were inconsistent in terms of what clothing
was being worn and the physical description including length
of facial hair.
The automobile seized in California was identified
as being owned by appellant and later identified by Marsha
and Misty Wright as the same automobile they observed in the
parking lot of Oakwood Jewelry.

-7-
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Appellant presented an alibi defense at trial in
that# at the time of the offense, he was with a man known as
Ceasar Boswell riding motorcycles and helping to prepare a
picnic area for a rally.
The court instructed the jury that the law of the
State of Utah allowed them to infer, when a person is in
possession of recently stolen property and fails to make a
satisfactory explanation of such possession, that the person
in possession stole such property.

(Record Pg. 188)

Appellant was convicted of all three offenses and
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I of this Brief will argue that appellant was
deprived of his rights under the 4th and 14th Amendment to
the United States Constitution in that the Los Angeles
police improperly seized evidence from the person and
automobile of appellant because they had no probable cause
to believe that there was contraband which existed; and
further that the police went beyond permissible limits in
conducting an inventory search of the automobile when they
opened the hood and the small box contained in the trunk.
The court erred in not suppressing that evidence and
permitting its introduction at trial.
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Point II of appellant's Brief will argue that there
was insufficient evidence to convict appellant of the
aggravated assault of Stella Kyarsguard because he was not
identified as the perpetrator of that particular offense nor
was there any evidence presented at trial to indicate that
he aided, requested, assisted, or commanded that crime be
committed.

The court erred in not granting appellant's

motion for a directed verdict of acquittal or in the
alternative an order of dismissal.
Point III of this Brief will argue that appellant
was denied due prossess of law when the court, improperly
instructed the jury that under the law of the State of Utah,
possession of property recently stolen, when a person in
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such
possession, is a fact from which they may infer that the
person in possession stole such property.

Such an

instruction shifts the burden of proof to the ultimate issue
from the prosecutor to the defendant.
Point IV will argue that defendant was improperly
convicted of both aggravated robbery and theft because,
under the circumstances of this case theft was a lesser
included offense of robbery and Title 76, Chapter 1, Section
402 (3) Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) prohibits
such a dual conviction.
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POINT I
SEARCH OF APPELLANTS AUTOMOBILE, WITHOUT A
WARRANT, WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED
AS BEYOND THE SCOPE OP AN INVENTORY SEARCH
The two Los Angeles police officers were on routine
patrol having been assigned to a burglary detail.

They had

gone by the Pink Motel in Los Angeles, California as a
routine gesture, knowing that this site was a common area
for persons engaged in drug trafficking.

Their experience

had been that stolen property was commonly connected with
such drug trafficking.

The officers had positioned

themselves in the parking lot of the motel in such a way as
to gain the best view of all activity going on.
When they observed appellant operating his
automobile with hydraulic lifts, which are illegal in

,

California, they determined to stop him with a view to their
continuing search for stolen merchandise.

When they had

seen other persons using drugs and smelled marijuana and

,

observed track marks on the arms of appellant they arrested
him for drug related offenses connected therewith.
Although the automobile could have remained in the

.

parking lot of the motel, they determined to impound the
same and inventory its contents.

t
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The issue in this context is the constitutional
scope of an inventory search.
In U.S. v Bloomfield, 594 F.2nd 1200, (8th Cir.
1979), the court examined a situation in which an automobile
was impounded for blocking traffic and a knapsack, which was
tied, was opened for the express purposes of examing its
contents.

The court, in this case, outlined the three

legitimate reasons the police might be permitted, without a
warrant, to inventory an impounded vehicle.

First, to

protect the owners property while in the custody of the
police.

Secondly, protection of police against claims.

Thirdly, protection against damage.
In United States v Hellman, 556 F.2nd 442, (9th Cir.
1977), where, from the facts of the case it became apparent
that an inventory was conducted as an investigatory
procedure rather than for legitimate reasons as outlined in
the Bloomfield decision, the court determined that the
search was really a pretext looking for incriminating
evidence.
A series of decisions from the United States Supreme
Court lends greater insight to the parameters of an
inventory search.
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In South Dakota v Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, (1976) a
car was impounded for parking violations and inventoried.
Marijuana was found in a glove compartment.

The Supreme

Court determined that such a search was not unreasonable as
a routine caretaking procedure.

"The inventory was not unreasonable in
scope. Respondent's motion to supress in
state court challenged the inventory only
as to items inside the car not in plain
view. But once the policeman was
lawfully inside the car to secure the
personal property in plain view, it was
not unreasonable to open the unlocked
glove compartment to which vandals would
have had ready and unobstructed access
once inside the car". supra, Footnote 10
Pg. 376.
In Arkansas v Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the
Supreme Court determined that the search of a suitcase
located in the trunk of a car lawfully stopped was
inpermissable.

In U.S. v Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the

search of a double locked foot locker was unreasonable
without a warrant.
The thread that runs through these decisions is
whether the police were engaged in a proper inventory
procedure, having lawfully stopped and impounded an
automobile.

The search is for true inventory purpose when

the prime motive was the securing of property for the
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reasons set forth in the Bloomfield decision.

Where the

police have engaged in an inventory procedure as a general
investigatory search it is necessary that a warrant be
secured.
In State v Crabtree, 618 P.2nd 484 (Utah 1980), this
court examined the inventory issue in the context of a case
where a person had been arrested for being a fugitive and
his suitcase was opened after he had informed police that
there was money and a firearm located therein.

Because of a

legitimate need to secure the property, which the defendant
in that case told the police existed within that suitcase,
and as protection, the police were permitted to open the
suitcase and examine its contents*
In this case it is clear that the inventory search
engaged in by the police was investigatory in nature.
First, the officers involved had little concern with the
fact that defendant had and was using hydraulic lifts on his
automobile.

Their detail was burglary and they were at the

motel looking for stolen merchandise.
Secondly, even after appellant was arrested for the
use of drugs, the police made no investigation as to whether
he was staying at the motel and if so whether the automobile
could remain there while they processed his arrest.
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Thirdly, the search of a locked trunk was
unnecessary because of the fact that the trunk was locked
and there was no indication that anything of value was
claimed by appellant to be located therein.

It is

interesting to note that appellant was never asked in
connection with the inventory whether anything existed of
value in the automobile.
Fourth, looking under the hood of the automobile,
although a typical police practice, was unjustified in the
inventory context.

Certainly they would not expect to find

anything that would fit into the legitimate inventory
requirements.

The officers could not articulate what items

they would expect to find under the hood of an automobile in
connection with their inventory.
Finally, without knowing that the jewelry had been
connected in a robbery in Salt Lake City, they seized the
same and then conducted an investigation to determine
whether it was stolen merchandise.
The law seeks to prevent unreasonable searches. An
inventory search is permissable if conducted with a
legitimate goal.

If the inventory search was a pretext the

evidence seized should have been suppressed.

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BECAUSE NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED WHICH SHOWED THAT HE
DIRECTLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OR AIDED OR
ABETTED ANOTHER IN THE COMMISSSION OF THE
OFFENSE
In this case the state charged the specific crime of
aggravated assault alleging that appellant either directly
committed the offense or encouraged, aided, assisted,
requested or commanded another to commit the crime.
Although there may have been evidence concerning appellants
participation in the robbery and theft, no evidence was
presented that appellant participated in the aggravated
assault of the named victim.
The two people who were in a position to witness any
aggravated assault, Stella Kyarsguard and JoAnn Knapus,
identified others as the direct perpetuators of the
offense.

The state presented no evidence that appellant

aided, encouraged, requested, or commanded that specific
offense be committed.
The states approach effectively blends the offense
of aggravated robbery with aggravated assault.

That is to

say, if one commits an aggravated robbery or aids or assists
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in the commission of that robbery then they necessarily have
committed an aggravated assault.

Rather than view each

crime as a separate offense, this approach would almost make
aggravated assault a lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery.
Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as Amended) defines the criminal
responsibility of those who act directly to commit the
offense or who aid another in conduct which constitutes an
offense.

The key element is the necessity that one must act

with the mental state required for the commission of that
particular offense.

Those that do not directly, commit the

offense but are still aiders need the requisite intent
before they are criminally responsible.
Aggravated assault, Title 76, Chapter 5, Section
103, Utah Annotated Code, (1953 as amended), in the context
of this case, required the actor to threaten another, which
threat was accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon.
Aggravated robbery, Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
302, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended),on the other
hand, is the unlawful and intentional taking of property,
accomplished by means of force or fear with the use of a
firearm.
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In aggravated assault the intent is to do bodily
injury or to threaten such injury with a show of force or
violence.

The intent in robbery is to take property in the

possession of another using a firearm.

One who aids in

either of these offenses must do so with the intent that
they engage in conduct that constitutes that particular
offense.

Part of each offense is the specific intent

required.
Consequently, because it was clear from the evidence
that others committed directly the offense of aggravated
assault on Stella Kyarsguard and as there was no evidence
that appellant aided or abbetted that particular offense,
the court erred in not granting a motion for directed
verdict or in the alternative to dismiss the offense.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY REGARDING
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY BECAUSE THAT
INSTRUCTION UNCONSTITUTIONALY SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO
APPELLANT REGARDING AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
Instruction 19, given to the jury, instructed that:
Under the law of the State of Utah,
possession of property recently stolen,
when a person in possession fails to
make a satisfactory explanation of such
possession, is a fact from which you may
infer that the person in possession
stole such property.
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That instruction was deficient in two regards.

The

first/ as a legally correct statement of the lawf the jury
was misdirected by the instruction.

Secondly/ the

instruction/ unconstitutionally/ shifted the burden of
proof/ on an element of the offense charged/ from the state
to appellant.
That instruction was based in part on Title 76/
Chapter 6, Section 402, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

That statute permits the presumption that

property/ recently stolen/ in the possession of defendant
would be deemed prima facie evidence that defendant stole
the property.

Instruction 19 failed to correctly state the

presumption articulated in this statutory provision.
The instruction used the word "fails" as oppose to
the statutory language of "know".

The significance being

the difference between remaining silent/ as is implied by
the statutory provision and offering some explanation which
in the judgment of the finder of fact failed to be
satisfactory.

In other wordsf the statutory language

contemplates, more strongly/ that no explanation is given as
opposed to the instruction/ by using the word "fails"/
implying an unsatisfactory explanation.
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The instruction used the word "infer" as opposed to
the statutory language which indicated that there would be a
"presumption" which would be deemed "prima facie".
An inference, of course, is a process of reasoning
by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is
deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a
state of facts, already proved or admitted.

Prima facie

evidence, on the other hand is evidence that, on its face,
is good and sufficient, unless it is not rebutted or
contradicted. (Refer: Blacks Law Dictionary)

On the one

hand an inference may be stronger, than prima facie because,
to infer implies that the logical consequence of having
established one fact inevitability leads to a conclusion
which does not change even in the face of other facts to the
contrary.

That application has greater strength given the

fact that the jury instruction in question instructed that
"under the law of the state of Utah" the jury may make such
an inference.
In any event, the instruction was a misstatement of
the statutory language from which it was drawn.
More importantly, the instruction unconstitutionally
shifted the burden to appellant in overcoming this legally
sanctioned inference.

-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969) the Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, applied the
standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to juvenile
matters.

The decision is a mini-thesis and conformation of

the application of the reasonable doubt standard to criminal
trials as the standard by which a defendant is to be found
guilty, and the burden of such proof is on the government.
The decision further confirmed the proposition that
the government must present, "proof of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged" supra, at
Pg. 364.
The application of those principles was applied to a
jury instruction wherein the jury was instructed that the
defendant is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts.
In Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) the
Supreme Court determined that the governments burden applied
to proving each and all of the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt and any instruction which
shifted that burden violated the constitutional principles
of due process of law.
"the threshold question in ascertaining
the constitutional analysis applicable
to this kind of jury instruction is to
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determine the nature of the presumptions
it describes. That determination
requires careful attention to the words
actually spoken to the jury, before
whether a defendant has been accorded
his constitutional rights depends upon
the way in which a reasonable juror
could have interpreted the instruction."
supra , at Pg. 514
The Sandstrom decision prohibited making the
presumptions which shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant.

However, in the recent decision of Francis v

Franklin, 105 Supreme Court Reports 1965 (1985), the Supreme
Court indicates that the use of the phrase "rebuttable" is
not despositive of the main concern of shifting the burden
of proof.
"analysis must focus initially on the
specific language challenged, but the
inquiry does not end there. If a
specific portion of the jury charge
considered in isolation, could
reasonably have been understood as
creating a presumption that relieves the
state of its burden of persuasion on an
element of an offense, the potentially
offending words must be considered in
the context of the charge as a whole".
supra, at Pg. 1971
In the Franklin case there was the instruction
involving intent, making it presumable that a person intends
the natural and probable consequences of his acts.

However,

there was the caveat that the presumption is rebuttable.
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The Supreme Court found that instruction unacceptable
because the evidence offered in rebuttal would necessary
have come from the defendant who has no burden to produce
any such evidence.
Although the instruction in this case did not use
the term presumption and further employed the qualifying
language of "may infer", it still did not overcome the
constitutional defects because it "instructs the jury that
it must infer the presumed fact if the state proves certain
predicate facts" supra at page 1971.
This'court considered these issues in State of Utah
v James D. Chambers 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 14f filed: October 21,
1985.
This courts analysis was that the statute which gave
rise to jury instructions of this type were
unconstitutional:

"because it directly relates to the issue
of guilt and relieves the state of its
burden of proof. The statue itself
however is addressed to the court and
merely provides a standard by which to
determine whether the evidence presented
warrants submission to the jury. Thus
the statutory language should not be used
in any form in instructing juries in
criminal cases, and we expressly disavow
the language and holdings of our earlier
cases to the contrary", supra, at Pg. 18
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Consequently because the language of instruction 19 shifts, at
least to some degree, the

burden of proof which must always rest with

the state and because the instruction is a direct spin off of the
statutory language contained in Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 402 (1)
misstating the lawf appellant urges that his constitutional right to
due process of law has been violated.

POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH
THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND THE
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT
The case was submitted to the jury on both the
offense of aggravated robbery and theft.

Under the facts of

this particular case theft is a lesser included of
aggravated robbery.

Title 76r Chapter 1, Section 402 (3),

Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) prohibits the
conviction of both an offense charged and an included
offense.
In State of Utah v Hill, 674 P.2nd 96 (Utah 1983)
this court examined this exact issue in relation to a charge
of aggravated robbery and theft.

In that case the defendant

held a pistol on a apartment manager and threaten to kill
him and a guest.

The manager and guest were bound and the

defendant subsequently took a tape recorder and other items

-23-
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of electronic equipment together with cash from a desk.

The

defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and theft.
This court concluded that under certain
circumstances involving aggravated robbery, theft becomes a
lesser include.

Three circumstances were outlined by which

aggravated robbery could be committed.

These circumstances

are outlined in Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code
Annotated, (1953 as amended).

They are, an attempt to

commit, during the commission of or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
This court concluded, "in contrast the
greater-lesser relationship does exists between theft and
the second variation of aggravated robbery (use of a gun
during the commission of a robbery)" Hill, at Pg. 97.
Because the facts of this case are essentially the
same as in Hill; that is, a firearm was used in the course
of committing a robbery, and the perpetrators of the offense
took property, appellant in essence has been convicted of
both the greater offense and the lesser offense.
Consequently, because such a result is prohibited by
Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 402, (3), Utah Code Annotated,
(1953 as amended), appellant is entitled to have the theft
conviction reversed and the sentence vacated.

-24-
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CONCLUSION
Because the search of Appellant's automobile went
beyond the scope of a true inventory search and was, in
fact, an investigatory device engaged in by the police
searching for incriminating evidence, the court should have
suppressed the jewelry obtained therefrom and not permitted
its introduction at trial.

The search of the trunk the

boxes and under the hood of the automobile went beyond
constitutional limits and the evidence should have been
suppressed.
There was insufficient evidence to convict appellant '
of aggravated assault.

Other persons were identified as

directly committing that offense and there was no evidence
that appellant aided those persons in its commission.
Instruction 19, which permitted an inference to be
drawn from the fact defendant was found in possession of
recently stolen property was a violation of due process of
law.

Also, defendant was improperly convicted of both

aggravated robbery and theft because the theft was a lesser
included offense, under the circumstances of this case, of
aggravated robbery.
For these reasons, appellant is entitled to a new
trial on the aggravated robbery, suppression of the evidence
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obtained from the automobile previously introduced at trial
and reversal of his conviction for aggravated assault and
theft.
- *

DATED this ^>

day of March, 1986.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

wmi.

ja&ei
Apxorney for Appellant
Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801) 322-1616

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
DELIVERED four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the Attorney General's Office/ 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

day of March, 1986.

'cT FRATTO, JR.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-2-202•

Criminal responsibility for direct commission of

offense or for conduct of another. - Every person, acting
with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.

76-5-102. Assault. - (1) Assault is:
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence/ to do
A

bodily injury to another; or
(b) A threat/ accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence to do bodily injury to another.
i
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76-5-103. Aggravated assault. -

(1) A person commits

aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
section 76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

76-6-301. Robbery. -

(1) Robbery is the unlawful and

intentional taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. aggravated robbery if in the

(1) A person commits

course of committing robbery,

her
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife
or a facsimile or a knife or a deadly weapon; or
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76-1-402•

Separate offenses arising out of single criminal

episode —

Included offenses. - (3) A defendant may be

convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the
included offense.

An offense is so included when:

(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of
the

offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,

conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a
lesser included offense.

76-6-402.

Presumptions and defenses. - The following

presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possesion
stole the property.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
Under the law of the State of Utah, possession of property
recently stolen, when a person in possession fails to make a
satisfactory explanation of such possession, is a fact from which
you may infer that the person in possession stole such property.
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impose sentence accordingly is D granted ©'denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by CB^a jury; a the court; a plea of guilty;
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misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by <JLJSDJthl
_ , and the State being represented by 3 HQ*l£>lCy, is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
C o f not less than five years and which may be for life;
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D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
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D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
OHMDefendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County H'for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
s/commitment shall issue
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D plea of no contest; of the offense of
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of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
_ _ _ years and which may be for life;
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D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
[^Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County (Ffbr delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
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misdemeanor, being now presentjn court and ready for sentence and
represented by 3, FfllHtO
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is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
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D not to exceed five years;
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D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
(B / befendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County ©"for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
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